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The China Trade: Legal and Economic
Considerations for American Lawyers
and Businessmen
by Dennis W. Bryan*
Introduction
The dream of a vast and untapped "China market" has stirred the
imaginations of Western businessmen since the time of Marco Polo.
After twenty years of ideological and commercial isolation, the
People's Republic of China [P.R.C.] has again emerged as a potentially
important trading partner for Western nations. 1 Trade with the P.R.C.
is attractive not only in terms of economics but also in terms of the
prospects for peace and rule by law that arise with close trade ties.
Westerners who contemplate trade with the Chinese must confront an economic and legal environment that is vastly different from
that encountered in trade with other countries. The goal of this article
is to acquaint Westerners with basic Chinese legal institutions, concepts and problems as well as with the primary economic influences
that an exporter or importer may expect to meet. An understanding of
the legal problems of Chinese trade requires a basic awareness of the
historical and ideological background behind the trade law and policy
of the P.R.C.
Any understanding of the trade policy and law of the P.R.C. must
be based upon an understanding of the forces that shape Chinese
opinion. The historical and cultural background of Chinese civilization
and of its initial and continuing contact with the West affects Chinese
attitudes toward Westerners and trade with them. This background is
overlaid with the influence of Marxist and Maoist ideology and the
twentieth century confrontation between China and the West. Finally, the
Chinese approach to trade is shaped by its government structure and the
natural and industrial resources that exist in China. These factors will be
briefly addressed.
Because of the long and glorious history of their country, the
splendor of its various empires, and its advanced intellectual and
philosophical level, the Chinese have traditionally regarded their
*Member of the North Carolina Bar; J. D. 1977, University of North Carolina School of
Law.
'The term "Western" refers to ideological tendencies rather than strict geographical location. For example, Japan is included under the term "Western." "Western" is
used interchangeably with "capitalist." "Capitalist" refers to systems in which market and economic operations are mainly determined by private incentives with
relatively minimal state control. "Communist" refers generally to systems of social
organization in which all economic and social activity is controlled by a single and
self-perpetuating party.
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2
country as the, center of the civilized world, the "Middle Kingdom."
They regarded all foreigners as "barbarians" from whom the Chinese
could gain nothing. Since the Chinese could gain nothing, trade was of
no use, so the government banned or discouraged it. Finally, in the
sixteenth century, 3 the Chinese permitted trade on a limited
basis.
4
Until 1842, trade with the West was limited to Canton.
Beginning in 1842, however, Chinese isolation ended as the Western powers waged wars5 to open other Chinese ports to trade with the
West. The wars ended with a number of treaties that violated China's
sovereignty and reduced her to a state of semi-colonialism. 6 The social
fabric of Chinese society began to dissolve, and numerous bloody
popular uprisings against the foreign Manchu rulers occurred. 7 By the
end of the nineteenth century, China was a tottering giant that had yet
to adapt to the modern world.
Western domination of China caused deep humiliation among the
strongly ethnocentric Chinese. It stifled Chinese economic growth by
destroying native industry that could not withstand the competition of
more advanced Western industry.8 Moreover, Western domination
exposed the Chinese to Western economic thought and the advantages
of the modern industrialized economy. 9 As a result of this Western
imperialism, the twentieth century brought attempts at reform, the
overthrow of the Manchus by Sun Yat-sen, and partial industrialization controlled by foreign capital and management.1 0 It also brought
the beginnings of Chinese Marxism.
When the Marxists, led by Mao Tse-tung, split with the Kuomintang in 1927, a long civil war began. The result was a further weakened
21. Hsu, THE RISE OF MODERN CHINA 10,

136-38 (2d ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited as

Hsu].

3

The Portuguese were the first Westerners to actively trade with the Chinese.
They4 were soon replaced by the Spanish and the Dutch. Hsu, supra note 2, at 130-33.
Hsu, supra note 2, at 185. For additional information on this system of limited
trade, see Hsu at 189-201.
5
They were: the "Opium War" - ending in 1842 - in which England sent a fleet
to attack the Chinese in order to defend the British right to trade in China; the "Arrow
War" of 1856-58 in which British and French vessels bombarded Canton for alleged
Chinese encroachments on British and French ships in the Canton harbor; the
Sino-French war of Annam in 1884-85 in which the technical and military backwardness of the Chinese was woefully demonstrated; and aggression and territorial
encroachments by tlhe Japanese and Russians, beginning in 1871 and culminating in
the defeat of China in the Sino-Japanese War in 1895. On this series of Sino-Western
wars, see Hsu, supra note 2, at 237-47, 259-63, 398-403, 386-97 and 406-18.
6
Hsu, supra note 2, at 245. "The Opium War introduced a century of humiliation
for the Chinese people." Hsu at 245.
7
Hsu, supra note 2, at 550-51.
8
Hsu, supra note 2, at 534. On the other hand, Western presence provided the
Chinese with at least a model for industrial undertakings and trained a substantial
number of Chinese technicians and industrial managers. Hsu at 535.
9
Hsu, supra note 2, at 595.
' 0 For in-depth treatment of Chinese history and institutions during the first half
of the 20th century, see generally Hsu, supra note 2, at 513-774.
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China that was faced with Japanese aggression in the 1930's. Only in
1949, after twelve years of war with Japan and four more years of civil
war, did Mao's communist forces finally establish dominance in
China. 11 China, then, had known only domination, oppression, conflict and cultural strife since its contact with the West had forced
adaptation to the modern world and its concomitant dislocation upon
it.
In common with other communist countries, a striking feature of
the P.R.C. is the extent to which its Marxist-Maoist ideology 12 permeates its institutions. The very structure of government as well as the
approach of that government to international law is shaped by Marxist
ideology.
Institutions of the government and of the Chinese Communist
Party [C.C.P.] are arranged in a parallel manner so that, for every
government agency, there is a similar C.C.P. body. 1 3 The C.C.P. in
reality is dominant and sets policy, including foreign trade policy. The
institutions of government, therefore, are merely instruments through
14
which the C.C.P. implements its programs and policies.
Although the party-government structure of the P.R.C. closely
resembles that of the U.S.S.R., Chinese communism is distinctive. In
1949 China was less industrialized than Russia had been in 1917 and far
less so than Marx and Engels had envisioned. Mao's support came
mostly from dissatisfied peasants, and in the civil war, his forces
controlled the countryside while the Kuomintang held the cities.
Because of this background, peasant life and rural collectivism have
been stressed since the revolution at the expense of the development of
heavy industry (with the notable and dismal exception of the ';Great
Leap Forward"). 15 Since the P.R.C. is less industrialized, it neither
exports many industrial goods nor seeks many technological imports.
The result of the historical and ideological forces that exist in
China is that the official P.R.C. policy is to achieve limited self"Hsu, supra note 2, at 761.
12Mao's interpretation of Marxism calls for the removal of all class distinction, the
withering away of the state, and the creation of a communist society characterized by
mutual assistance rather than class strife. The tactics by which the Maoist theory
hopes to accomplish these goals are peculiarly Chinese and explicitly collectivist. The
Chinese Communist Party [C.C.P.] claims the right to use whatever tactics are
necessary to eliminate class distinctions and establish a communist state. See F. HOUN,
A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINESE COMMUNISM 78 (2d ed. 1973).
"3For additional information on this P.R.C. Party-Government parallel structure,
see generally
Hsu, supra note 2, at 775-82; F. HOUN, supra note 12, at 83-109.
14F. HOUN, supra note 12, at 77.
15
Mendel, China and Orthodox Leninism, in ESSENTIAL WORKS OF MARXISM 487 (A.
Mendel ed. 1961). For additional information on Mao's version of Marxism, see
generally F. HOUN, supra note 12, at 77-111; see also essays collected in ESSENTIAL WORKS
OF MARXISM 499-562 (A. Mendel ed. 1961). Particularly enlightening is Mao Tse-tung,
On Practice, id. at 499, in which Mao gives his own explanation of putting communist
theory into practice.
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sufficiency. 16 Chinese distrust of the West caused by its nineteenth
century exploitation and its historical xenophobia was exacerbated by
the precipitate withdrawal of Soviet aid in 1960.17 Moreover, because
the Chinese view themselves as being ideologically pure in a world of
imperialists and revisionists (including the Soviet Union), selfsufficiency prevents taint from contact with the outside world, promotes
the collective spirit, and prevents the degeneration of the revolutionary spirit into revisionism. 18 Because of the policy of selfsufficiency, trade between the P.R.C. and the West is and probably will
remain predominantly agricultural.
The P.R.C.'s theory of international law is also heavily influenced
by the everpresent Maoist ideology. The P.R.C., in accordance with
the U.S.S.R., officially maintains that capitalist nations assert principles of international law in order to justify and further their imperialist
aggressions throughout the world. Chinese international law theory
otherwise differs from that of the Soviet Union. According to the
Soviets, international law is really an "agreement," or series of agreements, between sovereign states. These agreements are reached
through a process of cooperation, struggle, consultation, and compromise among capitalist and communist nations. 19 Originally, the
P.R.C. also adhered to this school of thought. Chinese theorists today,
however, reject the public policy and agreement-oriented approach of
the Soviets and assert the existence of a universal international law
based upon fundamental principles reflected largely in custom. The
United Nations Charter, to some degree, is deemed to express this
higher order of law. The Chinese believe that individual nations,
particularly capitalist ones, attempt to manipulate the United Nations
and other international organizations for nationalistic (and primarily
imperialistic) purposes. These manipulations are then justified by
being termed acts of international law. 20 The Chinese approach to
international law thus reflects a wariness of the motives and acts of
other countries and a preference for a relatively informal approach to
the regulation of conduct. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the
conduct of Chinese foreign trade.
China has never had a tradition of comprehensive national codes.
Before contact with the West, law was based upon the ethical teachings
of Confucius. Western law that was imposed in trade transactions of
the nineteenth century had an unsettling effect:
16Lubman, Trade Between the United States and the People's Republic of China:Practice,
Policy, and Law, 8 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1, 12 (1976).
17Id. at 11.
181d.
9
1 Hsiung, Peking's Attitudes Toward InternationalLaw, 3 CHINESE L. & GOVT 20, 84
(1970) (originally published in 1963).
20
Chou Keng-sheng, New Trends in Contemporary Anglo-American Theory of International Law, 3 CHINESE L & GOvT 20, 84 (1970) (originally published in 1963).
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In the realm of law.., it might be argued that the impact of
Western law served to undermine the Confucian ethic as a basis for
administration and the achievement of social justice, without being
able to take its place. It may be that the weakening of the ethical
basis of the Confucian state was not compensated by a firm
establishment of Western legal institutions,
and that China has
21
been left somewhere in between.

Law in the P.R.C. is subservient to ideology. 22 Its purpose is to
foster the policies of the C.C.P. 23 Because law is derived for the
masses, it must be expressed so simply that the masses can understand
and obey. 24 Lawyers play no role in the legal system. 25 There is no
comprehensive legal code for any area of substantive law. 26 The
National People's Congress has the responsibility of drafting and
enacting law, but it rarely meets. Instructions and regulations most
often emanate instead from the C.C.P. Central Committee or administra27
tive agencies.
Moreover, courts have very little function in the P.R.C. 2a The
Chinese disdain for courts, lawyers, and lawsuits reflects a long
Chinese tradition favoring friendly negotiation and conciliation over.
adversarial confrontation. 29 Even disputes between state enterprises,
involving large economic transactions crucial to the fulfillment of the
State Plan, are settled by negotiation and conciliation between the
administrative superiors of the enterprises. 30 In setting guidelines for
conciliation and mediation, the Chinese select decisions which represent a general "summing up of experience" rather than common law
31
stare decisis.
21Ssu-Yu TENG & J. FAIRBANK, CHINA'S RESPONSE TO THE WEST 2 (1954).
22Brown, Present-Day Law in the People's Republic of China, 61 A.B.A.J. 474, 475

(1975).
23Edwards, The Legal Framework of Chinese Trade, in

LEGAL ASPECTS OF DOING

BUSINESS WITH CHINA 63, 66 (H. Holtzmann ed. 1976). Indeed, the Chinese legal system

seems to conform much more closely to traditional Marxist thought than does the
Soviet model. The Soviets have fixed, comprehensive legal codes and procedures
whose application can generally be predicted and relied upon. As a result, in most
cases Soviet law is less flexible for government and Party manipulation than is
Chinese law. The role of law in the P.R.C. is perhaps the product not only of Party
doctrine but also of the absence of any tradition of an independent legal system
throughout Chinese history. Lubman, supra note 16, at 3.
24Edwards, supra note 23, at 66.
5
2 Lubman, On Understanding Chinese Law and Legal Institutions, 62 A.B.A.J. 597,

598 (1976).
26
For Americans to complain that the Chinese have no comprehensive legal codes
is somewhat ironic since neither does the United States. Cohen, China's Legal System,
in TRADE
WITH CHINA 126, 127-28 (Boarman ed. 1974).
27Edwards, supra note 23, at 67.
28id.

29Starr and Kaplan, The Legal Framework of China Trade, in DOING BUSINESS WITH
CHINA, AMERICAN TRADE OPPORTUNITIES IN THE 1970s, 382 (W. Whitson ed. 1974).
30 Edwards, supra note 23, at 68.
3"Starr and Kaplan, supra note 29, at 382.
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The American businessman who seeks to secure his contractual
expectations in trade with China should not look to the Chinese legal
process. He should instead become familiar with the administrative
structure and procedure that the Chinese have established for the
conduct and regulation of foreign trade. 32 He should also look to the
33
experiences of other Western traders dealing with China.
The extent to which the P.R.C. will promulgate more formal laws
and procedure in the future is uncertain. Since. World War II the
Chinese bureaucracy has grown. This growth, however, has not been
without struggle. Mao Tse-tung feared that bureaucratic rigidity would
undermine his doctrine of "uninterrupted revolution." In the late
1960Ys he initiated the "cultural revolution," partly in an effort to halt
Chinese bureaucratic growth. 34 The tension between the conflicting
forces of bureaucracy and "uninterrupted revolution" remains. It is
likely that as the ideological fervor of these early years of the P.R.C. is
slowly left behind, the complexity of the Chinese bureaucracy and its
role in the government will substantially increase. The result would
almost certainly be further development of more structured Chinese
35
legal institutions.
Largely' in reaction to a century of pre-1949 foreign economic
exploitation, the P.R.C. has been reluctant to modify a legal system
and ideology whose effect is to discourage trade with the West. Now,
more secure in foreign respect for their national integrity, the Chinese
seek further development of the rich natural resources that attract
Western business interests. The following is a brief survey of those
36
resources.
The first resource is people. Estimates of the Chinese population
as of 1971 range from 750 million to 900 million people, 95% of whom
are concentrated in the eastern half of the country where most of the
nation's arable land is located. P.R.C. citizens constitute one-fourth of
the world's population. Although sixteen Chinese cities have a population of over one million, the great majority of the Chinese people live in
rural areas. Shanghai is the largest city, with a population of more than
seven million. The Chinese labor force is 341 million, compared to 129
million in the Soviet Union and 86 million in the United States.
China ranks third in the world in proven coal reserves, which are
mostly in the country's north and northeast. More important to
32

See text accompanying notes 45-65 infra.
See Edwards, supra note 23, at 65.
34
Chinese bureaucracy dates back to prehistory. Basing its principles on the
Confucian classics, the bureaucracy became firmly entrenched in Chinese society by
the second century B.C. See Fairbank, The Nature of Chinese Society, in IMPERIAL CHINA
47-55 (1967).
3
SLubman, supra note 25, at 599.
36
Most of the information in the section is from CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY,
33

PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA ATLAS

(1971). Any other sources are footnoted separately.
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American interests are China's 2,700 million tons of proven oil reserves
37
and an estimated 4,000 million tons of undiscovered oil reserves.
Chinese oil production has grown in the last decade at an average
annual rate of twenty per cent.3 8 The P.R.C goal is a twenty-five per cent
annual growth rate through 1980. Even if Chinese oil production increases
at a lesser annual rate of ten per cent, the P.R.C. will be producing 130
million tons of oil per year by 1980. It will then need to import infrastructural oil equipment such as pipelines, drilling rigs, and refining ap39
paratus.
Mountainous areas of southern and parts of southwestern China
possess immense hydroelectric potential. Despite the enormous potential, however, development of hydroelectric power has been slow in
China. Conventional thermal electric plants account for over 70% of
the country's installed generating capacity. Although China's electric
power industry meets present Chinese demand, itsdevelopment and
technology are below Western standards.
These power-sources, together with abundant metal ores (particularly iron, tin, tungsten, antimony, and magnesium) favor the development of a diversified manufacturing complex comparable to that
of the United States or the Soviet Union. Because of the shortage of
modern equipment, paucity of modern plants, and scarcity of skilled
managers, engineers', and scientists, the P.R.C. is presently unable to
establish such a- sophisticated industrial network. As a result, the
Chinese must continue to rely heavily on foreign technology for the
design and manufacture of complex processing, refining, and finishing
equipment.
Despite its wealth in natural resources and the size of its labor
force, the P.R.C. is still relatively underdeveloped. While it is second
only to Japan in gross industrial output among Asian nations, it ranks
far behind the Japanese in per capita production. Chinese industry,
which is concentrated in China's northeast, has nevertheless grown
enormously since 1949. The increase in Chinese industrial output has
40
averaged ten per cent annually over the last fifteen years.
Agriculture remains the most important sector of China's
economy. Most Chinese today still earn their living from the soil,
despite P.R.C. efforts to industrialize. Chinese agriculture not only
37

CHINA TRADE REPORT 3

(P. Weintraub ed. Sept. 1977): Figures given are based on

1975 estimates.
38
N. Y. Times, March 20, 1977, at 4, col. 1. For recent Central Intelligence Agency
projections of future Chinese oil production and exportation, see N. Y. Times, April
16, 1977, at 11, col. 1.
39
CHINA TRADE REPORT, supra note 37, at 3. The Japanese and the Romanians
currently lead in sales to the Chinese of petroleum equipment, which the P.R.C. uses
in its extensive offshore drilling. See id. at 3-5.
40
N. Y. Times, March 20, 1977 at 4, col. 1. Chinese production increased only
three to five percent in 1976, However, industrial growth is expected to accelerate as a
result of the emphasis that Mao's successors have placed on economic expansion.
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must provide enough food and clothing for 900 million people, but also
must supply its growing industry with raw materials. The P.R.C. also
relies upon agricultural exports to provide it with foreign currency
with which to purchase vital imports. Foodstuffs, animal products,
41
and textiles constitute 75% of all Chinese exports.
Only 11% of Chinese land is suitable for cultivation. Nearly all of
this arable land is located in China's eastern half. However, in a
country where agriculture is so important, cultivated land per capita is
only .32 acres in the P.R.C., as opposed to 2.2 in the U.S. and 2.3 in the
U.S.S.R.
One obstacle to exploiting China's resources is the rudimentary
Chinese transportation system. China's principal form of transportation is railroads, which have been improved greatly since 1949. Roads
supplement the railway system and are primarily important for their
farm-to-market use. Only a small fraction of China's 300,000 miles of
roads is paved. Inland waterways provide an additional significant
means of transporting cargo in China.
Despite its resources, the P.R.C. accounts for only about 1% of all
world trade. 42 The total volume of China's two-way trade amounts to
four to five billion dollars per year, or about seven dollars per person.
In contrast, the United States has eighty to ninety billion dollars of
foreign trade per year, or approximately four hundred dollars per
person. 43 Eighty per cent of P.R.C. foreign trade is conducted with
non-communist countries. The only significant commodities of which
the Chinese export more than they import are foodstuffs, crude mate44
rials, fuels, and edible oils.

Legal Framework For Foreign Trade
The Chinese legal framework for foreign trade, modeled partly
after the Soviet structure, reflects the adaptation of a communist
economic system to international trade.4 5 The P.R.C. trades not only
with communist and underdeveloped nations but also with ideologically incompatible capitalist countries, some of whom do not officially
recognize the Peking government. The P.R.C. conducts foreign trade
for two main purposes: 1) to strengthen its industrial and military base
41
Note that these are items for which there isrelatively little American demand.
Problems and Prospectsof Trade with Eastern Eu rope and China (seminar speakers), 4 GA. J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 1, 21 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Problems and Prospects].
42
M. KLINGENBERG, L. MCQUADE, L. MULKERN, S. SWEET & D. TARNOWIESKI, TRADE
WITH CHINA, AN AMA RESEARCH REPORT 3, 4 (1972) [hereinafter cited as RESEARCH

REPORT].
4

31d. at 21.

44For

a 1973 list of the particular products the Chinese import and export, see E.

NEILAN & C. SMITH, THE FUTURE OF THE CHINA MARKET 51-4 (1974). For up to date lists,

write the U.S. Department of Commerce, Washington, D.C.
4-Cohen, Chinese Law and Sino-American Trade, in CHINA TRADE PROSPECTS AND U.S.
POLICY 148 (A. Eckstein ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as Cohen].
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and provide for the material needs of its citizens, 4 6 and 2) to achieve
economic self-sufficiency so that it need not depend on either assistance or trade from the rest of a world that has threatened the spiritual
and physical integrity of China for the last two centuries. Some experts
have attributed a third purpose to Chinese foreign trade. They deem it
a political tool for extending P.R.C. influence among both communist
47
and non-communist nations.
Chinese foreign trade is governed by import and export plans. The
export plan shapes trade so that the maximum amount of foreign
currency or import goods obtainable by barter is obtained. 48 Because
self-sufficiency is an economic goal, only those goods are imported
that will lead to the reduction of the Chinese industrial dependence
upon imported goods. 49 The import plan permits importation of goods
only after a search of domestic resources reveals that the goods cannot
be provided from within the P.R.C. 50 This search conserves valuable
foreign exchange.
In order to accurately determine import needs and export capabilities,
and to insure that appropriate measures are taken in
carrying out trade goals, the P.R.C. found it necessary to establish
highly centralized planning and control over foreign trade.5 1 Through
comprehensive control of a network of organizations, the P.R.C.
Ministry of Foreign Trade directs the Chinese foreign trade monopoly. 5 2 The Ministry submits annual import and export plans to the
P.R.C. State Council. Upon Council approval of these plans, the
Ministry supervises their execution.5 3 The Ministry is also responsible
for developing trade relations with other nations, for negotiating
bilateral and multilateral trade agreements, and for supervising the
following organizations: the Chinese Commodity Inspection and Testing Bureau [CITBI, the Chinese Foreign Trade Corporations [FTCs],
the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade [CCPIT],
5 4
and the Chinese Foreign Trade Arbitration Commission [FTAC].

46

1d. at 149.
Usack and Batsavage, The InternationalTrade of the People's Republic of China, in
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA: AN ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT (A Compendium of Papers of
the Joint Economic Committee of the U.S. Congress 1972).
48
Cohen, supra note 45, at 149.
47

49

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA ATLAS 68 (1971);

Hsiao, Communist China's Foreign Trade Contracts and Means of Settling Disputes, 22
VAND. L. REV. 503, 508 (1969).
5
- Hsiao, supra note 49, at 508.
"t Cohen, supra note 45, at 149.
52
The P.R.C. Ministry of Foreign Trade, which is headed by a minister and three
deputy ministers, divides the world into three major trading areas. The United States,
Europe and Canada are in the Third Department. RESEARCH REPORT, supra note 42, at
27; Starr and Kaplan, supra note 29, at 382.
53
1d.
5
41d. at 380.
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The CITB has the important task of monitoring the quality and
quantity of imports and exports. 5 5 It consists of more than fifty
branches in Chinese ports and in key production and transportation
centers. 5 6 The individual branches issuecertificates of origin, inspection, testing and weight, as well as notarial documents.5 7 Chinese
foreign trade contracts often call for the CITB to act as final arbiter for
the conformity of goods shipped with contract terms. The CITB has a
58
reputation for both fairness and reliability.
Western businessmen may expect to deal primarily with the
Chinese FTCs, since these organizations have major responsibility for
the actual conduct of Chinese foreign trade.5 9 Each of the eight FTCs is
responsible for a distinct set of commodities and services. 60 Each FTC
is also a distinct legal entity that can sue and be sued (but only to the
amount of its capital). 6 1 It may negotiate and enter into contracts with
foreign companies. The Peking government is not liable for actions of
the FTC. Although they are dcemed separate legal entities, they serve
62
to carry out the economic and foreign trade plans of the government.
The CCPIT fulfills a number of functions important to Chinese
foreign trade. These include: 1) maintaining contact with foreign business groups, chambers of commerce, and trade associations; 2) conducting trade fairs and exhibitions at home and abroad; 3) hosting
foreign delegations; 4) acting as an informal liaison for the FTCs; and 5)
running a service for the registration of foreign trademarks. 63 The
precise legal status of the CCPIT is unclear. Some sources, however,
consider it an independent legal entity in that it has the authority to
make trade agreements (albeit "unofficial" ones) with foreign organi64
zations in its own name.
Operating within the CCPIT are the Chinese FTAC and the
Maritime Arbitration Commission [MAC]. Each has authority to settle
'6
foreign disputes within its respective competence. 5
While the American businessman need not necessarily deal with
all of the branches of the P.R.C. Ministry of Foreign Trade, he can
expect negotiations with the Chinese to be time consuming and often
5

5Id.

s6Cohen, supra note 45, at 151.
57Edwards, supra note 23, at 68.
"Starr and Kaplan, supra note 29, at 380.
9

s RESEARCH REPORT, supra note 42, at 22.

60For a list of the Chinese FTCs, their addresses, and the products they import
and export, see China's Foreign Trade, Corporations and Organizations (China Council for the Promotion of International Trade 1975). This booklet can be obtained by
writing to: Tai Ping Chiao Street, Peking, People's Republic of China.
6'Cohen, supra note 45, at 152.
62Starr and Kaplan, supra note 29, at 380.
63
1d.
64Cohen, supra note 45, at 153-54.
6"For more on the Chinese FTAC, see text accompanying note 145 infra.
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costly and arduous. Thus, before contacting a Chinese FTC, a feasibility study of a company's potential benefits from trade with the P.R.C.
is necessary in order to determine whether potential rewards warrant
embarking on such an adventure. Research on the Chinese market is
difficult because of the P.R.C.'s closed political and social system. The
Chinese rarely report hard economic data, and Western businessmen
have practically no access to Chinese consumers. 66 The American
businessman may, however, limit his risks by considering the following factors.
First, the American trader should evaluate Chinese interest in
the product he wishes to buy or sell. He should concern himself
primarily with the immediate Chinese interest and market, since long
range predictions are highly speculative and risky. 67 One source of
information is-an examination of recent P.R.C. transactions with other
68
Western firms dealing in the same or a similar product area.
Second, the American firm or businessman should look to potential competition from other Western firms trading in similar products. Many such firms have relatively long-standing contacts and
experience with the Chinese. Unless an American wishes to sell a
unique or technologically advanced product, the Chinese may prove
reluctant to change trading partners when the present one has "old
69
friend" status.
The potential trader must also consider the volume of trade in
China in the product in question. China does not have a consumeroriented economy, and the government is often unwilling to redistribute production emphasis because there is increased foreign demand. 70 As a result, an American company may find trade with the
P.R.C. in a given area to be impractical because of volume limitations.
Fourth, American importers must be concerned with the quality of
Chinese goods. Laws in the United States that regulate labeling,
design, workmanship and material may exclude a Chinese product
66

Hersh, Entering the China Market, in DOING BUSINESS WITH CHINA, AMERICAN
1970s 434 (W. Whitson ed. 1974) [hereinafter cited as

TRADE OPPORTUNITIES IN THE

Hersh].
67
1d. at 440.
68
See, for example, the International China Notes section in the back of any issue
of the U.S.-CHINA Bus. REV., a magazine published bi-monthly by the National
Council for U.S.-China Trade. There one may find selling and buying reports concerning activities of American and foreign companies with China in specified product
areas.
The Central Intelligence Agency, Research Aid, People's Republic of China:
International Trade Handbook, prepared annually, is also a good source for evaluating P.R.C. interest in a particular product area. The publication discusses the volume
and commodity composition of Chinese imports and exports in the preceding year
and projects P.R.C. trading trends for the following year.
69
Hersh, supra note 66, at 440.
70
d.
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from resale in the United States. 7 1 American exporters of technologically advanced goods must consult United States laws to determine
72
whether the sale of the product to the Chinese is prohibited.
Last, projected delivery dates should be ascertained for a given
product before an American businessman concludes a contract with a
Chinese exporter. The time lag between contract and delivery by the
Chinese varies according to the type of product, its quantity, and its
place of manufacture in the P.R.C. 73 Delayed delivery may have
74
seriously adverse effects on resale in the United States.
For competent advice on these and other general considerations,
the American businessman should contact the following agencies or
representatives:
1) the National Council for U.S.-China Trade in Washington,
D.C.;
2) the P.R.C. Desk, U.S. Department of State;
3) the P.R.C. Desk, U.S. Department of Commerce;
4) the U.S. liaison office in Peking; and
5) the Commercial Section, Chinese liaison office in Washington,
75
D.C.
When a company decides to attempt trade with China, it must first
send a letter to the appropriate Chinese FTC. 76 In this letter the
American company should include product literature describing in
detail what it wishes to sell or buy. The prospective importer should
also "describe in detail the size and scope of the company's activity, its
annual sales volume, and its experience in importing and distributing
goods of the type it seeks to purchase from the P.R.C." '77 After further
correspondence, the FTC will issue an invitation. The American
businessman might then visit Chinese commercial delegations in the
United States or abroad. 78 Hopefully, the end result will be an invitation to the Chinese Export Commodities Fair in Canton.
The Canton Trade Fair, established in 1957, is the largest and most
important of several Chinese trade fairs. 79 It is held twice a year: in the
fall, from October 15 to November 15, and in the spring, from April 15
to May 15. The Chinese supplement the Canton Fair with smaller trade
fairs that specialize in selected commodities. Two examples are the
Chinese Forest Products Fair in Canton in February and the Garments
71

1d.
72See text accompanying notes 154-94 infra.
73Hersh, supra note 66, at 440.
74
Green, Fireworks From China, U.S.-CHINA Bus. REV. 14-16 (May-June 1976).
75
Theroux, Exporting to China: PracticalLegal Problems, in LEGAL ASPECTS OF DOING
BUSINESS WITH CHINA 129 (H. Holtzmann ed. 1976) [hereinafter cited as Theroux].
76
See note 18 supra.
77
Lubman, supra note 16, at 18.
78
Theroux, supra note 75, at 130.
79

CANADIAN DEP'T OF INDUSTRY,

TRADE AND COMMERCE,

MARKETS FOR CANADIAN

EXPORTERS, THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 17 (1974) [hereinafter cited as MARKETS].
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Exhibition in Shanghai in March. 80 The P.R.C. negotiates approximately 40% of all its foreign trade at the Chinese trade fairs."'
Most businessmen who trade, or who seriously desire to trade,
with the Chinese attend the Canton Trade Fair. s 2 Although the P.R.C.
is increasingly sending technical and commercial delegations abroad,
the Chinese much prefer to conduct business at home. 3 The Canton
Trade Fair not only provides the Chinese with a convenient setting for
dealings with Western traders, but also gives them an opportunity to
display new industrial designs and prototypes as evidence of the
PRC's technological progress.8 4 While the Canton Fair is primarily an
export fair that displays goods, it also offers goods for sale. 5
An invitation from a Chinese FTC is a prerequisite for attendance
at the Canton Fair. The Chinese often extend these invitations on the
basis of inquiries as to trade opportunities or on the basis of previous
trade, negotiation or attendance at the Canton Trade Fair.8 6 The 1972
Canton Trade Fair was the first to be open to Americans. Approximately one-half of the one hundred Americans who were invited
attended.8 7 Since 1972 American attendance has increased substantially. Hospitality and treatment of U.S. businessmen at Chinese trade
fairs has been excellent, which perhaps signifies the importance the
Chinese attach to American trade and encouragement of American
businessmen. 88
While the Canton Fair provides the prospective foreign trader with
an overview of products available for sale by all branches of each
Chinese FTC, a foreign purchaser may already know which FTC
branch offers the product that he wishes to import. In this case, he may
be better able to obtain the product by visiting the branch at its home
office between Fairs to do business there.8 9 If the Canton Fair is not
currently in session, the purchaser may contact an FTC and ask
permission to visit the home office of that FTC. The Chinese have
increasingly permitted U.S. importers to negotiate in Peking, Shanghai, Tientsin, and Canton. There the buyer may visit factories to

0

8 J. METCALF & V. RANGANATHAN, CHINA TRADE GUIDE 9 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
CHINA TRADE GUIDE].
8 1
MARKETS, supra note 79, at 17.
821t is also known as the Kwangchow Trade Fair. "Kwangchow" is the Chinese
word for Canton.
3

8 MARKETS,
84

supra note 79, at 15.

CHINA TRADE GUIDE,

supra note 80, at 414.

85

Chavkin, The Canton Trade Fair, in

DOING BUSINESS WITH CHINA, AMERICAN TRADE
OPPORTUNITIES IN THE 1970s 414 (W. Whitson ed. 1974) [hereinafter cited as Chavkin].
86
MARKETS, supra note 79, at 17.
87

Chavkin, supra note 85, at 412.
s d.
89
Lubman, supra note 16, at 24.
88
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discuss design, packaging, and labeling, rather than deal indirectly
through a Canton Fair trade negotiator. 90
Whether negotiating at a trade fair, at a Chinese FTC in Peking,
with FTC representatives in Shanghai, Tientsin, or Canton, or with
Chinese delegations abroad, the process is often costly and timeconsuming. Success or failure in reaching an agreement is frequently
determined by how the negotiations are conducted. Western
businessmen should thus be aware of some of the basic Chinese rules
of the game.
The Chinese trade fair is the most typical setting for negotiation
between a Western trader and his Chinese counterpart (usually a
representative of the appropriate FTC). The Western importer or
exporter must be prepared to fail to conclude an agreement at his first
Chinese trade fair. While failure to conclude an agreement on the first
visit is not inevitable, a visit is a success if the groundwork has been
established for negotiation and possible sales at a future trade fair. 91
Patience is crucial. The American businessman must be willing to
devote from two and one-half to three months per year to negotiations
in China. 92 Exceptions to this prolonged negotiation and sales process
occur only when the exporter has much needed technology that the
93
Chinese find unavailable from any other country.
During negotiations, the American businessman may receive a
lecture on communist ideology and the "hostile discrimination" of
American tariffs against Chinese products. 94 Ideological and political
overtones at Canton Trade Fair negotiations, however, have apparently decreased in recent years. 95
Generally, the Chinese expect very detailed information on the
wares of a Western seller in advance of a meeting so that face-to-face
discussion will be more productive. 96 An expert on the product that
the company is seeking either to sell or buy should accompany any
American delegation. Ideally, the expert should be the company president, or at least some company executive, since the Chinese deem such
representation important for both practical and social reasons. The
Chinese are somewhat reluctant to deal with a subordinate. 97 The
company executive should have the authority to approve all sales and
purchases immediately.
Negotiation in China is conducted by Chinese teams with three to
six members, and decisions are made on the basis of consensus among
901d. at 23.
9

'Chavkin, supra note 85, at 420.
at 415.
1d.
94
1d. at 417.
95
CHINA TRADE GUIDE, supra note 80, at 8.
96
Theroux, supra note 75, at 130.
97Chavkin, supra note 85, at 415.
92
1d.
93
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team members.9 8 Once terms are agreed upon, Western businessmen
may be frustrated by the Chinese practice of leaving these terms out of
the final draft of the written contract! Upon objection, the Chinese
assure the Western negotiator that any previously made verbal agreement will be carried out. 99 Most American businessmen are accustomed to having the smallest detail written into the contract and find it
difficult to trust the effectiveness of verbal transactions. Experience has
shown, however, that Chinese negotiators will live up -to'their verbal
commitments.10 0 Interestingly, the Chinese take a different approach
when buying. In that case, they want all product specifications written
out in detail. 1 1
In negotiation, the Chinese emphasize continuity and personal
contacts. The Chinese want to know the person with whom they are
dealing and prefer to negotiate with the same individual from year to
year. 10 2 This further illustrates the importance the Chinese attach to
"old friend" status when trading with a foreigner.
While the Chinese have a reputation for firmness and doggedness
in negotiation, they are actually often willing to be flexible and to
compromise. 10 3 However, hard-sell and know-it-all tactics have no
success in China. The Chinese place a premium on soft-sell, civility,
10 4
and politeness.
The length of negotiations is determined to a great extent by the
communication skills, adaptability, and flexibility of the trading parties. One expert on Chinese trade, Wallace Chavkin, attributes negotiation difficulties in part to the exodus of the most experienced Chinese
businessmen to Taiwan with Chiang Kai-shek * 1949.105 The traders
active in the P.R.C. today have a high degree
expertise and knowledge. Nevertheless, their wary and inflexible stance is in part the
consequence of inexperience with Western commercial negotiations.
This inexperience often results in unnecessary prolongation of talks
0 6
when P.R.C. representatives negotiate with Western businessmen.'
One alternative to direct contact and negotiation with the Chinese
is to use the services of a trading firm as an agent. These trading firms
are located mainly in Hong Kong and Macao. They usually conduct
98

1d. at 416.

99

1d.

101

1d. at 417.
1d. at 420.
1 03
Theroux, supra note 75, at 131.
1
°4Chavkin, supra note 85, at 420.
10 5 d. at 416.
10 6Id. For a detailed model approach to negotiating with the Chinese, in.cluding
comments on the modern Chinese psyche, as well as a suggested (and rather lengthy)
reading list for American negotiators, see H. Hoose, How to Negotiate with the Chinese of
the PRC, in DOING BUSINESS WITH CHINA, AMERICAN TRADE OPPORTUNITIES IN THE 1970s
449-69 (W. Whitson ed. 1974).
102
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their own trade with the Chinese, as well as serving as agents for other
companies.1 0 7 By leaving contact and negotiation to the proximately
located Hong Kong or Macao agent, the Western company can save in
travel, personnel, and administrative costs. Moreover, the agent firm
may often bring along any Western client who wishes to attend the
appropriate trade fair.10 8
These trading firms are sometimes more successful in negotiation
than novice Western traders in China since the agent firms usually
have "old friend" status because of dealings with the Chinese in the
past.109 The trading firms are also generally experts in the Chinese
market. Some of them, for example, have full-time research staffs
monitoring P.R.C. radio broadcasts as well as national and provincial
newspapers. Personal family contacts in China also often gather information for the trading agents. 110 A number of Western companies
have found the use of these Hong Kong and Macao based firms
extremely helpful.1 11
Trading by means of such an agent firm, however, does pose some
potential problems. Conflict of interest is possible where the agent is
already representing other clients in the same product area or is itself
trading in similar goods with the P.R.C. 112 Further, these trading firms
charge high fees, making their use prohibitive to the small or
medium-sized Western company. In some cases, the Chinese prefer to
deal directly with the American businessman rather than through a
foreign middleman. 113 Thus, an American company that wishes to
trade with the Chinese should consider carefully before using a trading
firm as an agent.
Whether or not the American company chooses to be represented
by a trading firm, the Chinese view the negotiation process as crucial.
Negotiation provides the Chinese with an opportunity to learn about a
potential trading partner, the company's product, Western technology, and Western market conditions in general, as well as a chance to
expound their political and ideological views. Despite the importance
attached to the give and take of negotiation, however, the Chinese are
somewhat inflexible as to what will be written in the final draft of their
foreign trade contracts. Since American businessmen will find Chinese
10 7Hersh, supra note 66, at 438.
1081d.
1091d.

"1Old.

"'For the experiences of two American importers, the Pyrotronics Corporation
and the Atomic Fireworks Company, see Green, supra note 74, at 15-16. The Pyrotronics Corporation, for example, resorted to a Hong Kong agent when it found it was
incapable of assuring that fireworks, negotiated and contracted for during the spring
Canton Fair, would be delivered in time to profit from annual July 4 sales.
112Hersh, supra note 66, at 438.
1131d.
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foreign trade contracts distinctive, the most salient features and patterns of such contracts demand separate consideration here.
Chinese foreign trade contracts fall into two major categories:
those with communist countries and those with non-communist countries. 114 Chinese contracts with communist states are governed by
intergovernmental agreements and protocols called "general conditions of delivery" that serve to simplify their bilateral contract negotiations. 115 Contracts between the Chinese and non-communist governments are much more complex. For example, unlike most contracts in
international trade, P.R.C. contracts are not made subject to any
foreign law. 116 The Chinese, moreover, attempt to execute their
foreign trade contracts in China because of the importance of the
concept of lex loci contractus in determining which law will apply.
When ChineSe law applies under conflicts rules, the Western
businessman will find little guidance for his conduct in case of breach
or uncertainty of contract terms, because the Chinese have no commercial code or comprehensive set of laws governing basic commercial
relations. The absence of a well-defined commercial law, combined
with Chinese refusal to submit their contracts to foreign law, makes
each contract's provisions particularly important.
Although Chinese FTCs employ seven forms of trade contracts
with non-communist countries, 117 the most common forms are straight
sale and straight purchase. 11 8 The Chinese FTCs have their own
standard contract forms and insist that they be used in transactions
with Western firms.'1 9 The Chinese assiduously seek to obtain provisions for use of the Bank of China 120 and the 1CPIT arbitral commission, the CITB, and the renminbi [RMB] 121 is t- e currency for payment
in trade agreements. 122 Insistence on contract provisions for the use of
PRC organs and currency reflects a certain Chinese paranoia resulting
from bitter decades of foreign exploitation of China.
1 14

Hsiao, supra note 49, at 504.
"'Cohen, supra note 45, at 160.
" 6 Starr and Kaplan, supra note 29, at 381.
'"These are: 1) straight sale or purchase, or reciprocal trade (when either party is
both seller and buyer); 2) barter; 3) consignment; 4) agency, sole or general; 5)
conditional agency; 6) distributorship; and 7) fixed distributorship. For a discussion of

each form, see Hsiao, Chinese Trade Contracts, in LEGAL ASPECTS

OF DOING BUSINESS WITH

CHINA 137-43 (H. Holtzmann ed. 1976).

118Hsiao, id. at 143.
"9Cohen, supra note 45, at 161.
12°For a discussion of the role of the Bank of China in Chinese trade, see text
accompanying note 134 infra.
21The renminbi [RMB] is the official Chinese currency. Its basic uni is the yuan,
and it is worth approximately .5 of one U.S. dollar. See Denny, Recent Developments in
the InternationalFinancialPolicies of the People's Republic of China, in CHINA'S CHANGING
ROLE IN THE WORLD ECONOMY

177 (B. Garth ed. 1975) for a table of the value of the RMB

vis-a-vis Western currencies over a two year period (1973-74).
122Starr and Kaplan, supra note 29, at 383.
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P.R.C. contracts of sale are less complex than those of purchase. 123
They also differ in the nature of delivery costs and insurance employed;
the Chinese usually seek to purchase on an FOB 1 24 and sell on a CIF

basis. 125 This permits the Chinese to arrange the shipping and to
handle the insurance through the People's Insurance Company of
China. 126

P.R.C. contracts with Americans are usually written both in English and in Chinese (though sometimes solely in English) and provide
that both languages are "equally controlling." When in both languages, however, the contracts generally fail to provide which lan127
guage will govern in case of an inconsistency in the texts.
Another potential problem may be found in contract provisions
covering force majeure. Events constituting force majeure are often not
sufficiently specific in Chinese foreign trade contracts.128 The Chinese
apparently do not deem labor disputes and strikes to be such an event.
Moreover, whether P.R.C. administrative interference with contract
129
execution constitutes force majeure is not clear.
Chinese preoccupation with obtaining maximum protection, as
well as their desire to extol the virtues of communist ideology, often
results in excessively detailed and even puzzling FTC contract
terms. 130 As mentioned earlier, however, 131 the Chinese prove to be
much more flexible and conciliatory when actually performing the
contract than the terms seem to indicate. For example, the Chinese
frequently will not enforce provisions concerning payment of indemnities
and penalties. 132 Again, this illustrates the traditional Chinese preference
1 33
for friendly conciliation and mediation.
Payment provisions constitute a particularly important aspect of
Chinese foreign trade contracts. P.R.C. contracts generally require an
1231d.
124FOB ("Free on board") means without charge to the buyer for goods placed on
board a carrier at the point of shipment. CIF ("cost, insurance, and freight") is used by
a seller to indicate that the price quoted includes the cost of the merchandise, packing,
crating, forwarding, and freight to a specified destination, plus insurance charges on
the shipping. THE UNABRIDGED RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (J.

Stein12 ed. 1971).
5Chinese Trade Contracts, supra note 117, at 158.
126Starr and Kaplan, supra note 29, at 384.
12Id.
12ald. at 385.
129The question would arise, for example, where the Chinese Ministry of Foreign
Trade revoked an FTC's import license for goods already purchased and shipped by
an American supplier for political reasons unrelated to the transaction. Starr and
Kaplan, supra note 29, at 385.
130 Reghizzi, Legal Aspects of Trade with China: The Italian Experience, 9 HARV. INT'L L.
J. 1, 107 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Reghizzi].
13See text accompanying notes 53 and 55 supra.
132Reghizzi, supra note 130, at 108.
33See text accompanying notes 145-53 infra.
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irrevocable letter of credit issued through a bank having a correspondent relationship with the Bank of China. 134 The Bank of China is
controlled and directed by the P.R.C. Chinese People's Bank. 135 The
latter is responsible to the Chinese Ministry of Finance. The Bank of
China represents the Chinese People's Bank abroad and makes international payments for the FTCs. 136 By its articles of association, the
Bank of China is a joint private-state enterprise in which private
investors receive a fixed 5% dividend per year and supposedly have
voting rights. 137 Because the Bank of China is so organized and is a
separate legal entity, it would seem that it could not invoke the defense
of sovereign immunity. 138 The Bank of China has an excellent reputa13 9
tion for honoring its obligations.
Provisions for letters of credit in Chinese trade contracts sometimes
call for payment in a Western currency. 140 Previously, payment
was almost always made in Western currencies until a series of European currency crises occurred during the late 1960's and early 1970's.
Because a planned economy must give high priority to order and
stability, the P.R.C. has increasingly sought to use its own currency,
the renminbi, in trade with the West. 14 1 The RMB is now widely used in
142
Chinese foreign trade and appears to-be a very sound currency.
The Chinese, however, have exhibited a marked unwillingness to
accept foreign credit (unlike the Russians, who accept it readily). Only
recently have the Chinese become willing to finance their purchases of
goods by using short and medium-term foreign credits. Chinese policy
in the area of credit remains very conservative. 1 43 If Chinese credit
policy changes, the P.R.C. may anticipate having few problems1 obtain44
ing credit from the West because of its high credit standing.
P.R.C. foreign trade contracts with Western companies usually
include provisions for settlement of disputes between the contracting
parties. These provisions call first for amicable settlement between the
134Starr and Kaplan, supra note 29, at 384.
135Smith, Standard Form of Contracts in the International Commercial Transactions of
the PRC, 21 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 13, 135 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Smith].
136Starr and Kaplan, supra note 29, at 384.
137Smith, supra note 135, at 135. The Chinese People's Bank owns two-thirds of
the Bank of China's stock. Starr and Kaplan, supra note 29, at 384.
138Smith, supra note 135, at 135.
1391d.
14 0
Starr and Kaplan, supra note 29, at 384.
14"Denny, Recent Developments in the International FinancialPolicies of the People's
Republic of China, in CHINA'S CHANGING ROLE IN THE WORLD ECONOMY 163, 167-68 (B.
Garth ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited as Denny].
42Starr and Kaplan, supra note 29, at 384. Still, the RMB remains an inconvertible
currency, since foreign-held RMB's must be deposited at the Bank of China and since
RMB exchange for other currencies is strictly regulated. Denny, supra, note 141, at 175.
43Denny, supra note 141, at 164.
' 44 Gott, China's Foreign Trade Policies and Practices, in TRADE WITH CHINA, ASSESSMENTS BY LEADING BUSINESSMEN AND SCHOLARS 92 (P. Boarman ed. 1974).
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parties by direct negotiation before resorting to arbitration. 14 s This
position is no different from that adopted by the International
Chamber of Commerce. Distinctively Chinese, however, is the lack of
concern for, or specification of, formal procedures for this amicable
conciliation. 146 Negotiation at this stage usually involves discussion
over tea (or perhaps over wine and dinner). Only when conciliation
47
and mediation fail can arbitration be pursued. 1
Whether the arbitration will be located in the P.R.C. or the Western state is perhaps the most important single issue involved in the
arbitration area. Location is crucial not only in determining the applicable law and procedure, but also in choosing the arbitrators and
umpire (who may tend to favor their compatriots). 1 48 It becomes
particularly critical because of the ideological split between the Chinese
and the West. Since Chinese Marxist ideology asserts that law is the
instrument of the ruling class, the Chinese feel that they will not
receive fair treatment under capitalist laws. 14 9 As a result, the Chinese
(like the Soviets) seek to arbitrate in their own capital; however, the
ambiguities of Chinese law render arbitration in Peking an unpredictable process. In addition, the close connection of the FTAC and MAC
with the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Trade and the various foreign
trade corporations raises the question of Chinese impartiality in Peking. 15 0 The American businessman may thus prefer to seek arbitration
in a third country.' 5 '
The Chinese FTAC is much less active than the Soviet FTAC after
which it was modeled. It also has fewer discernible formal procedures
than its Soviet counterpart. 5 2 The great majority of disputes that do
reach the P.R.C. Foreign Trade Arbitration Committee are resolved by
53
means of adjustment or conciliation.1
U. S. Strictures
When trading with China, the American businessman must be
aware not only of the legal and economic forces at work in the P.R.C.,
but also with the U.S. laws restricting trade with a country that the
14

SHsiao, supra note 45, at 513.
146Id.
1471d. Western businessmen should avoid resorting to lawsuits not only because
they are costly and time consuming, but mainly because such action would perhaps
irreparably affront the Chinese. Id.
8

14 id. at 515.
49

1 Id.

15°Starr and Kaplan, supra note 29, at 385.
15
'Provisions for third country arbitration must be included in the terms of the
Chinese FTAC contract. Depending upon the bargaining position of the Western
party, the Chinese have been willing to compromise and accept arbitration in third
countries agreeable to both sides. Smith, supra note 135, at 139.
152Cohen, supra note 45, at 165-66.
153
1d. at 166.
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United States government still deems potentially hostile to its interests.
Quite often the American businessman will find that U.S. laws constitute a much more inhibiting factor on desired trade than Chinese
policy or the peculiarities of the Chinese foreign trade system.
U.S. legal restrictions on trade with China began almost at the
inception of the P.R.C. government. The victory of Mao Tse-tung's
communist forces over the Chinese Nationalist Army in 1949 prompted
the United States, in the name of national defense, to enact legislation
which effectively imposed an embargo on United States trade with
China from 1949 to 1969. The embargo was designed to inhibit Chinese
economic and military growth by commercially isolating it. 5 4 The U.S.
Congress began by passing the Export Control Act of 1949155 restricting
U.S. exports to China. When the P.R.C. became involved in the
Korean War, Congress increased the severity of trade restrictions by
passing a series of measures that threatened withdrawal of United
States aid to countries that traded with the Sino-Soviet bloc.' 5 6 The
United States then sponsored a United Nations resolution recommending an embargo on shipments of strategic goods to China and North
Korea.1 57 Congress then amended the 1922 China Trade Act 5 8 definition of "China." The effect of the amendment was to exclude all P.R.C.
controlled areas from tax deductions available to China Trade Act
59
corporations.
The Chinese, however, were willing and eager to trade with the
United States in 1949. They made substantial overtures towards reestablishment of trade with the United States during the early years of
the embargo. 160 Today the Chinese have no laws directly restricting
U.S.-China trade.16 1 Indirect P.R.C. legal restraints do exist, such as
62
those curtailing entry into and travel within the Chinese mainland. 1
The effectiveness of the U.S. embargo decreased as the Chinese
greatly increased their trade with non-communist countries during the
154 Lee and McCobb, United States Trade Embargo on China, 1949-1970: Legal Status
and Future Prospects, 4 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 1 (1971). [hereinafter cited as Lee and
McCobb].
1ssCh. 11, 63 Stat. 7 (1949), (current version at 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401 et seq.
(1977)).
15 6For a description of these measures, see Lee and McCobb, supra note 154, at
3-10.
3S1G.A. Res. 500, 5 U.N. GAOR,
Supp. (No. 20A) 2, U.N. Doc. A/1775
(1951).
1"The 1922 China Trade Act was enacted to encourage trade with China. See 15
U.S.C. §§ 141 et seq.
9
1s I.R.C. § 941. For cogent arguments to the effect that the United States embargo
violated the traditional international law of reprisals, embargo, and boycott, as well as
laws of the United States and the United Nations, see Lee and McCobb, supra note 154,
at 15-21.
160Cohen, supra note 45, at 129-31.
16 11d. at 140.
162Id. at 144.
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1960's 1 63 in an effort that was prompted by the Sino-Soviet political
split to diversify their trade. 164 Amelioration of U.S. policy accompanied this increased Chinese trade with the West. The 1969 relaxation
of the Foreign Assets Control Regulations that permitted a limited
amount of Chinese noncommercial goods to enter the United States
was the beginning of a series of legislative and executive enactments
1 65
that removed most U.S. legal restrictions on trade with China.
Significant legal restraints on potential U.S.-China trade remain.
The 1917 Trading with the Enemy Act gave the Treasury Department
authority to issue Foreign Assets Control Regulations. These Regulations still provide the basis for freezing all bank accounts and assets in
the United States owned by the P.R.C. or its nationals, as well as for
prohibiting unauthorized transactions with the P.R.C.1 66 In December
1950, the Chinese expropriated assets of American nationals after the
United States had frozen P.R.C. assets. Although the Chinese have
stated their willingness to negotiate a settlement, 167 the expropriated/
frozen assets question remains a major obstacle to the expansion of
168
trade between the two countries.
The 1969 Export Administration Act, 169 which updates the 1949
0
Export Control Act, is the principal means of control of U.S. exports. 17
It gives the President the authority to restrict any and all U.S. exports
to China in order to safeguard national security, promote foreign
policy, and prevent the drain of goods that are in short supply
domestically. 1 7 1 United States proscription of exports under the 1969
Act are the most stringent in the world in terms of what commodities
may be exported and who may export them. 172 The Office of Export
Administration of the Bureau of Trade Regulation, within the U.S.
Department of Commerce, bears direct administrative responsibility for
the enforcement of the 1969 Act. 173
3

16 lnternational Trade Taxation-United States Taxation of Trade with China: Problems
and Alternatives, 8 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 189, 191 (1975). [hereinafter cited as International Trade Taxation].
164Cohen, supra note 45, at 140.
16 5For a list of executive and legislative enactments removing most United States
legal restrictions on trade with China, see Starr and Kaplan, supra note 29, at 387-90.
16650 U.S.C. app. §§ I et seq. (1970) and 31 C.F.R. § 500 (1971). Faced with the
possibility of frozen bank accounts, the Chinese refuse to establish a branch of the
Bank16of
China in the United States.
7
See N.Y. Times, Feb. 16, 1977, at 9, col. 1; BUSINESS WEEK, Aug. 22, 1977, at 42.
16
aSee ExpropriatedProperty, Frozen Assets, and Sovereign Immunity: Legal Obstacles to
United States-China Trade Relations, 15 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 254, 254-55 (1976).
P.R.C. funds frozen in the United States total $76.5 million, while American assets
seized by the P.R.C. are worth $196.9 million. N.Y. Times, Feb. 16, 1977, at 9, col. 1.
16950 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401 et seq. (1970).
17 0Starr and Kaplan,' supra note 29, at 387.
171S. PISAR, COEXISTENCE AND COMMERCE;

EAST AND WEST

GUIDELINES FOR TRANSACTIONS BETWEEN

116 (1970) [hereinafter cited as PISARI.

172Id. at 118.
'"3The Bureau of Trade Regulation is a component of the Industry and Trade
Administration.
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A number of other agencies in the executive branch regulate the
export of goods within their respective purviews. The U.S. Department of State's Office of Munitions Control, pursuant to Section 414 of
the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended, controls the export of
weapons and related technical data. 174 The Atomic Energy
Commission, pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, controls
exports of nuclear energy, materials, facilities, and related technology. 175 The Maritime Administration and the Department of Agricul176
ture also control exports within their fields of responsibility.
Under the 1969 Export Administration Act, export to China requires a license. The Office of Export Administration determines
whether the license will be issued in each case.' 77 The Office's wide
discretion, along with the unpredictability of its decisions, has
proven to be as inhibiting to trade with communist countries as the
export restrictions themselves. 17 If a license is denied, administrative
review or appeal to the Appeals Board of the Department of Commerce
is possible, but only in cases of obvious abuse will relief be granted. 179
United States regulation of exports to communist countries falls
into three categories, reflecting different degrees of strictness. In 1972,
President Nixon effectively placed China in country group "Y", along
with the Soviet Union and other East European bloc countries. The
P.R.C. is thus no longer a member of the most severely restricted
group, consisting of North Korea, Vietnam, and Cuba. 180
Several other U.S. legal considerations concern the American
businessman who contemplates trade with the P.R.C. Failure to grant
the Chinese "most-favored-nation" [MFN] status inhibits trade not
only by affronting Chinese national pride but also by often making

§ 1934 (1970).
17542 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2078 (1970).
17646 U.S.C. §§ 808, 835 (1970); 7 U.S.C. §§ 516, 581 (1970).
7
1 7PISAR, supra note 171, at 121-22.
178
1d. at 121. In fairness, however, this unpredictability stems from the necessity
that the office weigh conflicting objectives in a setting that is often highly volatile. For
example, items considered sensitive only a short time ago may suddenly no longer be
deemed strategic either because they have become obsolete or because the communists have discovered their secrets. Id. at 121, 122.
'17 Id. at 122.
80
lPoland and Romania comprise the other group. This group is treated least
stringently. Yugoslavia is not treated, in this context, as a communist country. See
Starr and Kaplan, supra note 29, at 389.
Any rational basis for treating China differently from the U.S.S.R. for purposes
of export regulation seems to have long disappeared. The reason for the disparity in
past years had been that the P.R.C. represented a greater threat to United States
national security than did the U.S.S.R. But since the Korean War, the Chinese have
invaded or militarily intervened in no country (the 1962 Sino-Indian conflict was
really a border dispute), while the Soviets have invaded both Hungary and Czechoslovakia, initiated the Cuban missile crisis, and injected Russian military personnel in
North Africa. Lee and McCobb, supra note 154, at 21-22.
17422 U.S.C.
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Chinese imports to the United States economically unsound because
comparatively high tariffs are placed on P.R.C. imports. The Trade Act
of 1974181 in effect sets two prerequisites for granting MFN status to the
P.R.C.: 1) a bilateral trade agreement between the two countries
covering, inter alia, safeguards for domestic industry, protection of
patent, trademark, and copyright interests of United States citizens,
182
and arrangements for trade promotion and settlement of disputes,
and 2) Chinese compliance with the Jackson-Vanik Amendment free183
emigration stipulations.
The American businessman must also be aware of U.S. Food and
Drug Administration regulations that cover the quality and labeling of
products. Chinese goods often fail to meet these regulations. 184 Insurance coverage may be necessary to protect him against the usual
P.R.C. refusal to accept responsibility for FDA rejection of imported
Chinese goods. 185 Furthermore, tax incentives under the 1922 China
Trade Act, which once encouraged trade with pre-1949 China, no
186
longer apply to the P.R.C.
Moreover, pursuant to the 1951 Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act, as amended [Battle Act], the United States participates with
fourteen other nations in the International Coordinating Committee on
Strategic Trade with Communist Countries [COCOM], in which the
members voluntarily restrict exports to preserve their mutual security. 18 7 COCOM arrangements are considered moral obligations

rather than commitments binding members under international law. 188
The United States has attempted to adopt a separate, independent
position in which its export restrictions to China and other communist
countries are stricter than those of the other COCOM members. 189 The
effectiveness of this position, however, depends upon the extent to
which the other member nations adopt restrictions as strict as those
defined in the Battle Act. 190 The result, particularly during times of
detente, is a double standard whereby firms in Japan and West Europe
18 1Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978 (codified in 31 U.S.C. §§ 5, 19, 26 (1975)).
182
Surrey, Growth and Outlook for U.S.-China Trade, in LEGAL ASPECTS OF DOING
BUSINESS WITH CHINA

7, 14 (H. Holtzmann ed. 1976).

' 8 3Chinese compliance with the Jackson-Vanik Amendment in the near future is,
to say the least, improbable.
184U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, REPORT No. 76-11, COMMERCIAL IMPORT DETENTIONS 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 16, 20 (Nov.
15-19, 1976).
1SsLubman, supra note 16, at 22.
18 6
nternational Trade Taxation, supra note 163, at 189. See also text accompanying
notes1864-5 supra.
Starr and Kaplan, supra note 29, at 387. COCOM members include Japan and all
NATO countries other than Ireland.
' 88 PISAR, supra note 171, at 131.
1891d. at 133.
1901d. at 134.
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may engage in commerce forbidden to American companies. 191 Thus,
American firms are sometimes the victim of an essentially ineffective
U.S. law.
Lastly, the United States businessman must consider the attitude
of the labor movement in the United States and the possible effect that
trade with the P.R.C. might have on labor-management relations.
Since the 1960's, and particularly since 1972, when the U.S. registered a trade deficit for the first time since 1888, the AFL-CIO has
become a major proponent of import regulation. The AFL-CIO is afraid
that keeping U.S. markets open for low-wage, foreign-made goods
could lead to the eventual destruction of American markets, industries,
and jobs. This concern has found substantial expression in the 1972
Foreign Trade and Investment Act. 192 In addition, the Amalgamated
Clothing Workers of America, the Textile Workers Union of America,
and the International Ladies Garment Workers Union are particularly
concerned about the effect of a potentially large influx of Chinese
textiles, fiber, and clothing into the U.S. These unions have actively
urged additional regulations to curtail the importation of such goods
from China in case overall American-Chinese trade increases substan19 3
tially.
Concern for domestic employment thus leads United States labor
to favor exports and discourage Chinese imports. 1 94 In the future,
however, the Chinese will probably insist on balanced trade with the
United States.
Conclusions
The volume of future U.S.-P.R.C. trade will be largely determined
by the quality, type and amount of Chinese goods produced. For
example, sophisticated foreign markets such as the United States
frequently require the redesign of Chinese export commodities. The
P.R.C. often finds this difficult because many of its exports are manufactured in decentralized units in rural areas or urban neighborhoods.
In such small and isolated units, changing design and materials and
retraining workers can prove particularly difficult and timeconsuming. As a result, Chinese planners are often unable or reluctant
to meet foreign market preferences by using limited production re1 95
sources to redesign export commodities.
Moreover, Chinese exports are predominantly agricultural; the
United States can generally satisfy its demand for food, animal pro1911d.

192 Bonner and Kaufman, Control of Imports: Attitudes of American Labor, in DOING
BUSINESS WITH CHINA: AMERICAN TRADE OPPORTUNITIES IN THE 1970s 114, 116 (W. Whitson

ed. 1974).
1931d. at 117.

1941d.

195Lubman, supra note 16, at 14.
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ducts, and textiles at home. On the other hand, potentially immense
Chinese oil reserves could supply the United States with significant
future petroleum imports. In turn, American technological exports and
expertise could help accelerate P.R.C. industrial growth and exploitation of China's natural resources.
Ideology will continue to play a critical role in determining the
volume of P.R.C. domestic production and thus the extent of its trade
with the United States. One Chinese economics expert notes that
P.R.C. domestic economic performance since 1949 has varied according to the degree to which the regime has emphasized ideology. 196 The
greater the emphasis on ideological purity, the slower the Chinese
have developed commercially. Furthermore, ideological dissention
within the Chinese ranks has led to periods of domestic instability,
such as the Cultural Revolution of the 1960's, which severely curbed
P.R.C. industrial output. Chinese exports will necessarily be limited by
the level of Chinese industrial development.
Chinese ideology will also influence the willingness of the P.R.C. to
trade with the United States. P.R.C. doctrine still deems communism
and capitalism to be ultimately irreconcilable forces with the United
States being the world's primary capitalist, imperialist agressor. What
is uncertain is the extent to which the P.R.C. might continue to limit its
trade with the United States for ideological reasons. At present, the
Chinese wish to avoid too much dependence on capitalist nations for
trade; thus, a large proportion of their foreign trade is with other
communist countries. 197 Furthermore, Chinese ideological sympathy
with Third World nations encourages development of trade relations
with those countries. Not only will the under-developed nations meet
many of China's raw material import demands, but they will also absorb
significant portions of Chinese productive output. 198 Western nations
must compete for what is left of Chinese demand and supply.
Despite significant P.R.C. trade allocations to communist and
Third World countries, the Chinese conduct most of their trade with
Western, advanced nations. The 300 percent increase in their trade
with the West since 1961199 perhaps reflects a softening of CCP
doctrine. As a result, American businessmen must compete primarily
with other Western businessmen for the China trade. At present,
American businessmen and companies generally find themselves at a
196

Richman, Ideology: The Ultimate Constraint on China Trade, in TRADE WITH CHINA;
62, 63 (P. Boarman ed. 1974).
19 See generally Donnithorne, China's Trade with the Communist World, in DOING
BUSINESS WITH CHINA: AMERICAN TRADE OPPORTUNITIES IN THE 1970's 55, 66 (W. Whitson
ed. 1974).
19 8
U.S. Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Dep't of State, Report No. 298,
Communist States and Developing Countries: Aid and Trade in 1974, at 6, 20 (1976).
ASSESSMENTS BY LEADING BUSINESSMEN AND SCHOLARS
7

199

Yeh, China's Trade with the Third World, in DOING BUSINESS WITH
1970s 70, 72 (W. Whitson ed. 1974).
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As a result of this competitive disadvantage, the U.S. government
can and should take steps to create a legal environment facilitating
U.S.-Chinese trade. For example, it should initiate negotiations for a
tax treaty between the U.S. and China similar to the 1973 U.S.-Soviet
tax treaty. 20 1 By superseding I.R.S. provisions, such a tax treaty would
permit the resolution of tax problems on an intergovernmental level
rather than in the courts of either nation. It would also create more
certainty in trade relations between the two countries than is created
20 2
by complicated and frequently amended U.S. tax statutes.
The U.S. legislative and executive branches should also work
together to draft and negotiate a comprehensive bilateral trade agreement between the two countries as a step toward the granting of MFN
status to the P.R.C. 20 3 Because of China's insistence upon equal treatment

in its trade relations with other countries, the granting of MFN status to
China will ultimately be necessary to realize the full potential of U.S.P.R.C. trade.
The U.S. government might consider further action. For a number
of years the British have offered an excellent model for an approach to
developing trade relations with the Chinese. Since the late 1950's,
British businesses, trade organizations, and government have worked
together to determine general trade possibilities with China and to
establish strong trading ties between the two countries. The idea is
that, while trade with China remains competitive even among British
businesses, a concerted effort can attract a greater portion of Chinese
20 4
trade from which all British businessmen will ultimately benefit.
Canada has adopted a similar approach. In this manner, the British
and Canadians have established a great competitive edge in the China
trade.
The death of Mao Tse-tung in the fall of 1976 has led to a further
question. It is unclear whether the new leadership, under Party
Chairman Hua Kuo-feng, will continue the policy of enhancing trade
relations with the West or give way to more hardline forces within the
government that advocate a return to ideological purity. It would seem
that as the ideological fervor of the early days of the P.R.C. subsides,
the existing regime will place increased value on stability and economic

2 00
Especially in light of applicable U.S. restrictions. See text accompanying notes
154-94
supra.
20 1
For text, see Convention between the United States of America and the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics on Matters of Taxation, June 20, 1973, 12 INT'L LEGAL
MATERIALS 899 (1973).
20
2InternationalTrade Taxation, supra note 163, at 204.
2 03
See text accompanying notes 181-183 supra.
2
°4Chavkin, supra note 85, at 421.
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prosperity. This likelihood, together with a recent trend in the liberalization of U.S. laws and policy, bodes well for prospects of future trade
relations between the U.S. and the P.R.C.

